Nigeria is often portrayed in international headlines as simply “unstable,” a sweeping, unhelpful label that conceals a far more complex and geographically specific crisis. For those seeking to understand the country’s security situation, the details matter enormously. Over the past ten years, I have conducted extensive field research across Nigeria with a particular focus on the north, carrying out on-the-ground interviews with victim communities, local leaders, survivors, and witnesses. What I found challenges vague narratives and points to identifiable actors perpetrating the majority of violence in two critical regions: the Northwest and the North Central.

Systematic data gathered by the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA) consistently records a significant proportion of Christian victims even in predominantly Muslim northwestern states, evidence that the violence carries a dimension that purely ethnic or economic explanations cannot fully account for. This piece argues that the crisis is best understood as ethno-religious in character: rooted in ethnic identity, but inflected with religious targeting that demands honest acknowledgment.

The Northwest: Bandits, or Something More?

In Nigeria’s Northwest comprising states such as Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, and Kaduna, the dominant perpetrators of mass violence are armed groups widely referred to as “bandits.” This label, while useful as shorthand, does not fully capture the sophistication, the ethnic profile, or the religious dimensions of these actors.

After conducting field interviews across victim communities in this zone over ten years, my research found that at least 95% of the perpetrators are of Fulani origin. This finding is broadly consistent with what credible international and Nigerian bodies have documented. Approximately¹ 30,000 Fulani bandits operate in several groups in northwest Nigeria, with individual groups consisting of anywhere from 10 to 1,000 members. These are not loosely organized mobs. They are structured armed networks that have carved out territories, imposed illegal taxation on farming communities, and responded to resistance with lethal force.

This ethnic and religious identification of the bandits was confirmed publicly by one of Nigeria’s most senior political figures. In September 2021, then-Katsina State Governor Aminu Bello Masari, himself a Fulani man made an extraordinary admission² on Channels Television’s “Politics Today” programme, stating that the bandits were “the same people like me, who speak the same language like me, who profess the same religious beliefs like me.” He added that “majority of those involved in this banditry are Fulanis, whether it is palatable or not, but that is the truth,” and noted that some fighters had infiltrated from West and North African countries, all of Fulani extraction. His candid acknowledgment effectively confirmed from within Nigeria’s political establishment what field researchers and affected communities had long documented.

What makes these groups particularly alarming is the level of weaponry in their possession. Bandit gangs notably downed³ a Nigerian Air Force Alpha Jet on 18 July 2021, a stunning demonstration of anti-aircraft capabilities. This is not the profile of ordinary criminals; it is the profile of an insurgent-level armed group⁴.

The Religious Dimension in the Northwest

Framing the northwest violence purely as criminality or ethnic predation risks missing an important layer. ORFA data document a disproportionately high number of Christians among the dead in northwestern states, including Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, and Kebbi states where Christians are a demographic minority. The targeting pattern is not random. Churches have been burned, Christian farming communities repeatedly selected for raids, and witnesses across multiple communities have reported attackers chanting Allahu Akbar during assaults. This does not make every attack a formally declared religious war, but it does mean that religion functions as a marker of who is targeted and who is spared in many attacks in the region.

The historical memory of the Usman Dan Fodio jihad of the early nineteenth century, which transformed the religious and political landscape of what is now northern Nigeria remains a live current in the identity of sections of the Fulani community. This does not reduce every Fulani herder to a jihadist. But it means the violence should be understood as ethno-religious in character: ethnicity and religion are intertwined as both motivation and method. The term “ethno-religious warfare” captures this more accurately than either “religious warfare” (as practised by Boko Haram and ISWAP) or plain criminality. Minority Christian communities in the Muslim northwest have come under attacks in a manner that suggests they are being targeted. For example, in Faskari LGA of Katsina state, the ORF four-year report shows a significant number of Christians killed. Considering the small population of Christians in the LGA, there is no better explanation to the number killed than being targeted.

Furthermore, the convergence between bandit groups and declared jihadist networks adds an additional dimension to an already dangerous situation. ISWAP and Boko Haram factions  including Ansaru, Mahmuda, and Lakurawa  have claimed attacks in northwest Nigeria, and some bandit groups have reportedly forged⁵ alliances with these jihadist organisations. The economic impact has been devastating regardless of motive. Armed Fulani militant networks have inflicted catastrophic damage on Nigeria’s economy and governance, with deliberate destruction of farms and grain stores triggering soaring food prices and nationwide food insecurity, and millions displaced since the crisis began.

The Middle Belt: Armed Herdsmen and Ethno-Religious Targeting

In Nigeria’s Middle Belt, covering states such as Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, Niger, and Kwara, the picture is similar in terms of perpetrator identity but different in framing. Here, the media refers to armed actors as “Armed Herdsmen” rather than bandits. My field research, spanning ten years of interviews in the Middle Belt, led me to the same conclusion as in the Northwest: over 95% of the perpetrators are of Fulani descent.

Attacks on 23 to 24 December 2023 in Plateau State left at least 200 people dead and more than 500 injured across no fewer than 20 rural communities in Bokkos and Barkin Ladi Local Government Areas, were attributed to Fulani militants. Less than two years later, on 14 June 2025, at least 258 Christians were brutally murdered in Yelwata, Benue State, in an attack attributed to armed Fulani militia fighters. These are not isolated incidents. They form part of a sustained and escalating pattern of violence against settled farming communities, communities that are overwhelmingly Christian, carried out with apparent impunity and, in documented accounts, accompanied by religious invocations.

The Nasarawa Connection

Field research and security reporting have established that some of the most lethal Fulani militant groups operating across the Middle Belt do not simply emerge from within the states they attack. Several armed groups have maintained known encampments in Nasarawa State, using these as staging posts for coordinated raids into Plateau, Benue, Taraba, and other Middle Belt states. This cross-state operational pattern, attackers arriving, killing, and retreating to camps across state line has frustrated local security responses and allowed militant networks to strike with impunity while remaining outside the effective jurisdiction of any single state authority. This is not a local herder dispute; it is a coordinated militant operation with identifiable logistics, known geography, and a command structure that must be addressed at both federal and state levels

Religious Markers in Middle Belt Attacks

The ethno-religious character of the Middle Belt attacks is well-documented, and the evidence is substantial. Across multiple states and many years of field interviews, survivors and witnesses have consistently reported the following:

Burning of churches. The deliberate targeting and destruction of Christian places of worship has been documented in attacks across Plateau, Benue, Taraba, and Southern Kaduna. In numerous incidents, church buildings are primary targets, not incidental casualties of fighting.

Chants of Allahu Akbar. Multiple survivor testimonies, corroborated by field researchers and documented record attackers chanting⁶ “God is Greatest” in Arabic during raids on Christian communities. This is not consistent with violence that has no religious dimension.

Targeting of pastors and their families. Church leaders have been disproportionately killed or abducted in attacks across the Middle Belt. The deliberate elimination of religious leaders signals an intent that goes beyond land and grazing disputes.

These patterns do not mean that every armed Fulani herder is motivated primarily by religion, or that ecological pressures are irrelevant. But when attackers burn churches, announce their actions in religious terms, and single out pastors for killing, the violence has crossed into ethno-religious territory that demands a different analytical and policy response.

Governor Elrufai’s Admission

The identity of the perpetrators responsible for killings in Southern Kaduna was confirmed by the state’s own governor. In December 2016,⁷ then-Kaduna State Governor Nasir Elrufai made a public admission that he had identified the killers as Fulani, including foreign Fulani fighters from Cameroon, Niger Republic, Chad, Mali, and Senegal. Rather than pursuing legal accountability, Elrufai disclosed that his government sent emissaries across borders to appeal to these individuals to stop the killings, because he, as governor, was Fulani like them. He stated plainly that he sent people to tell them “there is a new governor who is Fulani like them and has no problem paying compensations for lives lost and he is begging them to stop killing.”

What the World Needs to Understand

The violence in northern Nigeria is not random or faceless. Field research consistently points to identifiable armed groups, predominantly of Fulani origin, operating with sophisticated weapons, organised command structures, cross-state logistics, and ethno-religious motivations that make the label “farmer-herder conflict” dangerously inadequate.

Framing this crisis as mere “ethnic conflict” or “farmer-herder clashes” serves several false purposes: it implies mutual fault between two equal parties, it erases the religious dimension of targeting, and it obscures the organised, predatory, and often one-sided nature of attacks on civilian communities. ORFA data demonstrate clearly that Christians bear a disproportionate share of the killing, not only in the Middle Belt, where this might seem demographically predictable, but in northwestern states where Christians are a distinct minority. That pattern is not an accident of geography; it is evidence of targeting.

For policymakers, aid organisations, and international observers, understanding who the perpetrators are and what drives them is not an exercise in blame. It is a prerequisite for crafting responses that can actually protect lives. The communities I interviewed are not statistics. They are people who have survived raids, buried their dead, seen their churches burned, and are still waiting for meaningful intervention. This crisis demands a response commensurate with its actual character: ethno-religious violence, prosecuted by organised armed groups, with identifiable actors, documented methods, and a regional geography that crosses state and national borders.

Steven Kefas has conducted field research across northern Nigeria for over ten years. Data referenced from ORFA (Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa) is available at www.orfa.africa . For previous reporting on these communities, see the author’s coverage in www.middlebelttimes.com 

1. “Northwest Nigeria Has a Banditry Problem. What’s Driving It?” The Global Observatory, May 2024. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2024/05/northwest-nigeria-has-a-banditry-problem-whats-driving-it/ ︎
2. “Most Bandits Are Fulani Who Profess Same Religious Beliefs as Me — Masari.” Punch, September 2021. https://punchng.com/most-bandits-are-fulani-who-profess-same-religious-beliefs-as-me-masari/ ︎
3. “Nigeria: Fighter Plane Shot Down by Bandits — Military.” Med Africa Times, July 2021. https://medafricatimes.com/23909-nigeria-fighter-plane-shot-down-by-bandits-military.html ︎
4. ︎
5. https://adf-magazine.com/2021/04/alarming-alliance-nigerias-bandits-terrorists-team-up/ ︎
6. https://www.csw.org.uk/2025/06/17/press/6545/article.html ︎
7. “We’ve Paid Fulani to Stop Killings in Southern Kaduna — El-Rufai.” Vanguard, December 2016. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/12/weve-paid-fulani-stop-killings-southern-kaduna-el-rufai/ ︎

By Steven Kefas, May 2026

The terrorists conveniently called bandits by the media had a rule. They stated it plainly, in the open, in front of their captives: Fulani people would not be taken. They were brothers. Christians  and certain Muslims majorly non-Fulani were fair game. What happened next depended entirely on which category you fell into.

Sunday Cletus was abducted on 28 February 2026, while travelling through Kachia Local Government Area in Kaduna State. What he witnessed and endured over the days that followed was not random cruelty. It was, according to his account and the findings of extensive field research spanning multiple states and multiple years, a system, deliberate, consistent, and organised around two variables: religion and ethnicity. The differential treatment of Muslim and Christian abductees by Fulani Ethnic Militias (FEM) in Northern Nigeria is among the most under-documented dimensions of a security crisis that has displaced hundreds of thousands and left communities across Kaduna, Plateau, Kogi, and the wider Middle Belt and northwest regions in a state of sustained terror. While public attention has focused on the frequency and geography of attacks, which villages were raided, how many were killed, the testimony of survivors reveals that what happens after capture is equally telling, and equally horrifying.

‘They Are Our Brothers’

The classification begins at the point of abduction. Cletus reported that his captors were explicit: Fulani individuals were not to be targeted because of ethnic solidarity. The instruction was not whispered or implied. It was declared. In that moment of capture, a sorting mechanism was set in motion that would govern every subsequent hour of captivity.

This is not a single camp, a single commander, or a single incident. Field interviews conducted across multiple states over several years return the same account with remarkable consistency: from the moment of capture, Muslim abductees and Christian abductees enter different realities. “For a Christian in Southern Kaduna, the danger of being kidnapped is compounded by the near certainty of harsher treatment, higher ransom demands, and a meaningfully greater risk of death, not because of anything they have done, but because of their faith.” Says a retired security personnel who spent 4 months in captivity in Southern Kaduna.

Inside the Two-Tier System

Survivor testimonies describe a captivity environment divided into two parallel experiences. Muslim abductees are, in the words of multiple survivors, treated with a degree of restraint. They are generally not subjected to the physical and sexual violence that Christian captives endure as a matter of routine. They receive adequate food. They are permitted relative freedom of movement within the camp. In documented cases, they have been allowed to observe religious obligations. The logic, as captors have articulated it in the presence of Muslim detainees, is one of communal solidarity, a fellow Muslim, however different in ethnicity or background, is assigned a different moral status.

For Christian captives, the experience is of another order entirely. Men are beaten systematically  not as punishment for specific behaviour, but as a baseline condition of captivity. Women face the additional horror of sexual violence. Cletus described an environment in which abuse was pervasive, in which captives were entirely at their captors’ mercy, and in which psychological torment was deployed as deliberately as physical violence. Christian abductees are subjected to prolonged uncertainty, repeated threats of execution, and in documented cases, forced to witness violence against fellow captives as a mechanism of coercion and terror. There are exceptions. Field research has documented cases in which non-Fulani Muslim abductees were also treated harshly, suggesting that ethnicity intersects with religion in complex ways. But the pattern holds across the breadth of the data: faith is the dominant variable.

The Price of Faith: Ransom Asymmetry

The differential does not end with conditions in captivity. It extends into the financial machinery of release. Across field interviews with survivors and families in the north central region and parts of the northwest, a consistent pattern emerges: Muslim abductees are released on comparatively lower ransoms, negotiations are shorter, and in several documented cases, Fulani community intermediaries with informal access to the armed groups have facilitated release with minimal negotiation.

For Christian families, the process is an ordeal of a different kind. Demands are higher. Timelines stretch for weeks. The threat of lethal consequences for delay or non-compliance is more frequently and more credibly invoked. Field interviews document cases in which families gathered and paid the full ransom demand, only to receive no release, followed by escalating demands. In some cases, Christian abductees were killed even after their families complied.

The death that Sunday Cletus described witnessing, a teenage boy executed because his family did not initiate negotiations quickly enough is not an aberration. It is an example of a broader operational logic in which a Christian life is assigned a lesser and more conditional value, one that can be cancelled at will.

A Religious Hierarchy of Human Worth

What emerges from years of field testimony is not a picture of chaotic, opportunistic violence. It is a picture of a system, one with internal rules, consistent practices, and an embedded hierarchy. Religion functions as a determinant of fate at every stage of the abduction experience: who gets taken, how they are treated in captivity, on what terms they may be released, and whether they survive.

This pattern is consistent across multiple states, multiple armed groups, and multiple years of survivor testimony. It is not incidental variation between individual captors. It is, as the evidence compels us to describe it, a religious hierarchy of human worth embedded in the operational logic of Fulani Ethnic Militias. The implications reach beyond security analysis. The same sorting mechanism documented in community attacks where Muslim members of mixed villages are spared while their Christian neighbours are killed is replicated and deepened inside the captivity system itself. Faith does not merely determine who is attacked. It determines what they endure, how much their life is worth in negotiation, and whether they return.

The Reckoning

Sunday Cletus came home. Many do not. His testimony, set against the accumulated weight of survivor accounts gathered across the region over years, forces a confrontation with a dimension of Northern Nigeria’s security crisis that policy discussions have consistently failed to address with adequate seriousness.

The violence is not indiscriminate. The suffering is not evenly distributed. And the religious character of the crisis does not begin and end with the moment of attack. It permeates the entire machinery, the raid, the abduction, the camp, the negotiation, the release, or the execution. Until that reality is named plainly and confronted directly, the communities living under it will continue to bear its weight largely alone.

Steven Kefas is an investigative journalist, Senior Research Analyst at the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa, and Publisher of Middle Belt Times. He has documented religious persecution, terrorism and forced displacement in Nigeria’s Middle Belt for over a decade.

In 2015, when the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) ranked Armed Fulani militants as the fourth deadliest terror group in the world, Nigeria was already grappling with the brutal reality of multiple security threats. Yet nearly a decade later, as these same militants have grown exponentially more lethal, they have mysteriously vanished from international terrorism rankings —despite becoming what many security experts now consider Nigeria’s most deadly non-state armed group. This paradox raises troubling questions about how the global community measures and responds to terrorism, particularly when it involves complex ethnoreligious conflicts in Africa. While international attention remains focused on jihadist groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a more devastating threat has been systematically erasing entire communities across Nigeria’s Middle Belt.

The Numbers Tell a Devastating Story

Recent data from the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA) paints a picture of unprecedented violence that dwarfs the carnage attributed to Nigeria’s better-known terrorist organizations. Note: The following data represents preliminary research findings that have not yet been published on ORFA’s website but are based on their ongoing documentation efforts. Between October 2019 and September 2024, ORFA documented 66,656 deaths across Nigeria, of these, 36,056 were civilians. The Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM) were responsible for a staggering 47% of all civilian killings —more than five times the combined death toll of Boko Haram and ISWAP, which together accounted for just 11% of civilian deaths.

These figures represent more than statistical abstractions; they reflect a systematic campaign of violence that has fundamentally altered the demographic landscape of Nigeria’s Middle Belt. The data reveals that 2.4 Christians were killed for every Muslim during this period, with proportional losses to Christian communities reaching exceptional levels. In states where attacks occur, Christians were murdered at a rate 5.2 times higher than Muslims relative to their population size.

The scope of violence extends far beyond killings. ORFA documented 13,437 incidents of extreme violence during the five-year study period, including 29,180 civilians abducted. The trajectory of kidnappings alone illustrates the escalating nature of the crisis: from 1,665 civilians abducted in 2020 to 7,705 in 2022, before declining slightly to 6,255 in 2023, then rising again to 7,648 in 2024. By the end of 2024, the International Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that 3.4 million Nigerians had been forcibly displaced from their homes by conflict and violence.

A Pattern of Systematic Violence

Unlike the headline-grabbing attacks of jihadist groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP, Muslim Fulani militants violence follows a different but equally devastating pattern. ORFA’s research indicates that 79% of civilian killings are land-based community attacks, where armed groups “invade mostly small Christian farming settlements to kill, rape, abduct, and burn homes.” This methodology, while less spectacular than suicide bombings or mass hostage situations, has proven far more effective at achieving long-term territorial control and demographic change.

The geographic concentration of these attacks is particularly telling. The North Central Zone and Kaduna state have borne the brunt of FEM violence. ORFA documented 3,776 incidents with civilian killings and 1,990 incidents with civilian abductions. Most of them by FEM. This concentrated campaign has effectively depopulated entire communities while military resources remain focused on the North-East and North-West regions where Boko Haram/ISWAP and Fulani bandits operate.

Recent mass casualty events underscore the escalating brutality of these attacks. The Yelwata massacre of June 13-14, 2025, stands as one of the most horrific examples, where FEM militants killed over 150 people—mostly women and children—in the farming community of Yelwata in Guma Local Government Area of Benue State. This attack followed a familiar pattern of targeting vulnerable agricultural communities during periods when people are fast asleep.

The violence is not new, but its intensity has dramatically increased. The Agatu Massacre of February-March 2016 saw between 300 and 500 people killed by FEM in Agatu Local Government Area of Benue State, marking one of the earliest large-scale coordinated attacks that would become the group’s signature methodology. More recently, the Christmas Eve massacre in Bokkos Local Government Area of Plateau State claimed over 200 lives, demonstrating how FEM deliberately targets Christian communities during religious celebrations to maximize psychological impact.

The Global Terrorism Index Conundrum

The disappearance of Fulani militants from GTI rankings despite their escalating lethality raises fundamental questions about how international terrorism monitoring systems categorize and prioritize threats. The GTI, published annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace, uses specific criteria to define terrorist incidents, requiring acts to be intentional, involve violence or threat of violence, and have sociopolitical objectives.

However, the framing of Fulani militia violence as “farmer-herder conflicts” or “ethnic clashes” rather than terrorism may have contributed to their exclusion from global terror rankings. This categorization problem has real-world consequences, affecting international aid allocation, security cooperation, and diplomatic pressure. When violence is labeled as communal conflict rather than terrorism, it receives less international attention and fewer resources for intervention. The methodological approach of global terrorism databases may also inadvertently favor tracking spectacular attacks by designated terrorist organizations over systematic violence by ethnoreligious militias. While Boko Haram’s suicide bombings and mass kidnappings generated international headlines and clear database entries, the daily reality of village raids, targeted killings, and forced displacement may be underreported or miscategorized.

The Cost of Invisibility

The absence of Fulani militias from international terrorism rankings has had profound implications for Nigeria’s security response and international support. While billions of dollars in international aid and military assistance have flowed toward countering Boko Haram and ISWAP, the regions most affected by Fulani militia violence have received comparatively little attention or resources.

This mismatch between threat levels and resource allocation has allowed the crisis to metastasize. ORFA’s data shows that what security experts describe as “twin” Islamist threats—Boko Haram/ISWAP in the northeast and Fulani militias in the Middle Belt—have created a pincer effect that is reshaping Nigeria’s religious and ethnic geography. The human cost extends beyond immediate casualties to include the systematic destruction of agricultural communities that form the backbone of Nigeria’s food security. As Christian farming communities are displaced or destroyed, the country faces not only a humanitarian crisis but also long-term food production challenges that could affect regional stability.

Questions Demanding Answers

The case of Nigeria’s invisible terror crisis demands serious examination of how the international community monitors and responds to political violence. If the deadliest group responsible for civilian casualties can operate below the radar of global terrorism indices, what other threats are being overlooked? How can monitoring systems be reformed to capture the full spectrum of political violence, regardless of whether perpetrators fit traditional terrorist profiles?

The ORFA data suggests that Nigeria is experiencing what amounts to a slow-motion genocide in its Middle Belt, with one ethnic militia group systematically targeting civilian populations based on religion and ethnicity. The pattern evident from Agatu in 2016 to Yelwata in 2025 shows a consistent strategy of mass killing designed to achieve territorial control and demographic change. Yet this crisis receives a fraction of the international attention devoted to other jihadist groups operating in Nigeria with lower casualty rates.

As Nigeria heads into an uncertain future, the international community must grapple with uncomfortable questions about selective attention to terrorism and the consequences of allowing certain forms of mass violence to remain invisible. The 36,056 civilian deaths documented by ORFA represent more than statistics—they are fathers, mothers, children, and community leaders whose lives were cut short while the world looked elsewhere. The time has come to acknowledge that terrorism takes many forms, and the deadliest threats are not always the ones that make international headlines. Until global monitoring systems adapt to capture the full spectrum of political violence, groups like the Fulani militias will continue to operate in the shadows, leaving devastation in their wake while escaping the accountability that comes with international recognition and response.

As President Bola Tinubu marks his second year in office this May, a comprehensive analysis of Nigeria’s security landscape reveals a troubling reality: despite promises and claims of improved security, terror groups are gaining ground, adopting new tactics, and threatening the nation’s food security with strategic attacks on farming communities in the Middle Belt.

Security Stagnation Under New Leadership

When President Tinubu assumed office in May 2023, he inherited a nation plagued by various security challenges. His administration pledged to tackle these issues with renewed vigor and strategic approaches. However, data from the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA) paints a different picture.

Table 1. Comparison of the trends of civilians killed and abducted in the geopolitical zones

Although the number of killings went down, the number of kidnappings went up with nearly the same number of victims. Taken together: -2%.

Table 2. Comparison of the trends of incidents with civilians killed and abducted in the geopolitical zones

The same holds true for the incidents with killings or kidnappings. The number of incidents with killings went down, while the number of incidents with kidnappings went up. Taken together: +5%.

Changing Tactics

The security situation in Kaduna and some states in the North West tell a story of adaptation rather than elimination. Local government areas such as Kajuru, Chikun, Kauru, and Kaura have experienced a shift from mass casualty attacks to targeted kidnappings.

This tactical shift suggests that while dispersed FEM bandits from the North West have successfully infiltrated Kaduna state, they currently lack the coordination and capacity for large-scale attacks. Instead, they have pivoted to kidnapping for ransom operations, which require fewer resources while still generating funding and spreading terror.

The raw numbers tell a stark story. Despite changes in leadership and security strategies, the situation on the ground remains largely unchanged—or in some regions, has deteriorated significantly.

Plateau State: Strategic Targeting of Farming Communities

Plateau State, once known as Nigeria’s “Home of Peace and Tourism,” has become an epicenter of violence with particularly troubling patterns emerging in 2025. This is a continuation of the trend that was visible in 2024 compared to the previous four years.

Table 3. Trend of civilians killed in Plateau State

The data show slightly more attacks (+4) with seriously more victims (+119).

Recent attacks in Plateau State reveal a calculated strategy to disrupt the farming season. The timing of these attacks—coinciding with planting periods—suggests a deliberate attempt to prevent farmers from accessing their lands, threatening food production in a region crucial to Nigeria’s agricultural output.

The Berom Youth Moulders Association’s recent press statement raises alarming concerns about threats of future attacks. These warnings indicate a coordinated campaign to permanently displace farming communities, creating a long-term food security crisis that could affect the entire nation.

Emerging Terror Groups Threaten Nigeria’s Food Basket

The North Central region and by extension the entire northern part of the country, responsible for a significant portion of Nigeria’s food production, faces an unprecedented convergence of threats from existing and newly emerging terror groups:

• The emergence of Lakurawa in Sokoto and Kebbi states
• Mahmuda group establishing presence in Kwara and parts of Niger state
• Ansaru terror cells setting up operations in Kogi state
• Resurgence of Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM) attacks in Plateau and Benue states

These developments represent not just isolated security incidents but a strategic encirclement of Nigeria’s food-producing heartland. The concentration of these groups in areas responsible for staple crop production suggests a deliberate attempt to control food resources and destabilize the nation’s economy.

Over the overall 5-year reporting period, the North Central zone has experienced most attacks with civilian killings during the farming season—much more so than in other geopolitical zones. This trend reinforces the strategic nature of these attacks, designed to maximize disruption to Nigeria’s food production capabilities.

Fig. 1. Civilians killed per month in the geopolitical zones for the overall 5-year reporting period (Oct 2019 – Sep 2024)

North East: Boko Haram and ISWAP Show Renewed Capability

While the government has repeatedly claimed significant victories against Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), recent events tell a different story. These groups have demonstrated improved tactical capabilities, successfully launching complex attacks on military facilities in the North East.

These attacks on hardened military targets indicate that terror groups are not retreating but adapting and potentially growing stronger than they were two years ago. Their ability to challenge the Nigerian military directly represents a significant shift in the security landscape.

Kidnapping Crisis: The Balloon Effect

While the military has made notable progress in neutralizing bandit leaders in states like Zamfara, Katsina, and Sokoto, a worrying pattern has emerged. Rather than eliminating the threat, these operations appear to have created a “balloon effect”—squeezing criminals from one area only to see them reappear in neighboring regions.

Table 4. Trend of civilians abducted in four northwestern states

Kidnappings in Kaduna State had a 37% increase compared to the foregoing 4-year average. For Katsina State it was 97%, Sokoto State 108% and Zamfara State 156%.

Kaduna and other North West states have experienced a dramatic surge in kidnappings, suggesting that foot soldiers from disbanded bandit groups have relocated to more vulnerable areas. This pattern reveals a critical gap in security operations—the failure to simultaneously secure potential escape routes and vulnerable neighboring regions during major offensives.

Military Efforts and Challenges

The Nigerian military continues to make sacrifices including paying the ultimate price as seen recently in the ongoing fight against insurgency. Their operations have successfully neutralized several high-profile bandit leaders and disrupted terror networks. These efforts, particularly in the North West, have yielded important tactical victories.

However, the persistence and adaptation of terror groups highlight the need for a more comprehensive approach. Military operations must be more intentional, ensuring that when pressure is applied in one area, adjacent regions are secured to prevent the displacement of threats rather than their elimination.

Conclusion: A Nation at a Crossroads

The comprehensive data analysis reveals a Nigeria standing at a critical juncture. The country faces not merely isolated security incidents, but a systematic campaign that threatens the very foundations of national survival. The strategic encirclement of food-producing regions by multiple terror groups, combined with the seasonal timing of attacks to maximize agricultural disruption, points to a sophisticated understanding of Nigeria’s vulnerabilities by hostile actors.

The economic implications extend far beyond immediate security concerns. With major food-producing states under siege and farming communities displaced, Nigeria risks a food crisis that could trigger widespread social unrest, economic collapse, and massive internal displacement. The targeting of the Middle Belt—Nigeria’s agricultural heartland—represents an existential threat to the nation’s food sovereignty.

International observers and Nigeria’s development partners must recognize that this is no longer a regional security issue but a potential humanitarian catastrophe with implications for West African stability. The failure to address these interconnected threats comprehensively threatens to transform Nigeria from a regional power into a failed state, with consequences that would reverberate across the entire continent.

The window for effective intervention is rapidly closing. Without immediate, coordinated action that addresses both the security symptoms and underlying drivers of conflict, Nigeria faces the prospect of becoming unable to feed its own population while simultaneously battling multiple insurgencies across its territory.

Researchers at the Observatory of Religious Freedom in Africa recorded over 55,000 killings and mapped thousands of farm massacres and mass abductions in a four-year period, including in Nigeria’s fragile North Central Zone and Southern Kaduna.

A little-known terror group, the Fulani Ethnic Militia or FEM, commit mass killings hundreds of times a year through this region.

Across the country, over 11,000 incidents¹ of extreme violence took place during the data period, with more than 55,000 killings and 21,000 abductions. In the North Central zone alone, 3,007 incidents of extreme violence occurred.  2,010 incidents involved killings, 700 were abduction incidents, and 297 were a combination of killings and abductions.

Now data mapping has revealed security operations are concentrated in the North-East and North-West of Nigeria, hundreds of miles from the scenes of FEM atrocities

The map on the left (Fig.1) shows all killings in recorded violence incidents. 

The map on the right (Fig.2) shows incidents in which mostly militants were killed as government forces engaged Islamists.

Across the North-Central zone and Southern Kaduna – where hundreds of FEM atrocities occur – there is markedly little security engagement at the scene of attacks.

‘Millions of people are left undefended,’ notes Frans Vierhout, Senior Analyst at The Observatory of Religious Freedom in Africa.  ‘For years, we’ve heard of calls for help being ignored, as terrorists attack vulnerable communities.  Now the data tells its own story.’

Please access the full report here

Key Findings: 

• 55,910 people were killed in the context of terror groups in Nigeria within four years
• Only a fraction of civilians were killed by ISIS or al-Qaeda affiliates. The little-known Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM) killed at least 42% of all civilians in community attacks, while Boko Haram and ISWAP (‘Islamic State West Africa Province’) combined killed 10%
• The Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM), an ethno-religious terror group, are considered by many security experts to be a ‘twin’ of Islamists killing and kidnapping civilians in Northern Nigeria
• Land-based community attacks form the largest category of civilian killings (81%). FEM invade small Christian farming settlements to kill, rape, abduct and burn homes
• 2.7 Christians were killed for every Muslim in the reporting period
• Islamist extremists kill both Muslims and Christians, although Christian death tolls are far higher
• Proportional loss: in states where attacks occur, proportional loss to Christian communities is exceptionally high. In terms of state populations, 6.5 times as many Christians are being murdered as Muslims

Abduction:  hallmark of Islamist terror

The ORFA data project also reveals the widening reach of Islamist kidnapping in Nigeria, with incidents escalating through the four years: 2020 (1,665 people abducted) 2021 (5,907 people abducted) 2022 (7,705 people abducted) and 2023 (6,255 people abducted).

Christians are 1.4 times more likely to be abducted than Muslims.   In terms of state populations, proportional loss of Christians is higher:  around 5.1 Christians are abducted for every Muslim in terms of local populations.

‘Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM) are targeting Christian populations, while Muslims also suffer severely at their hands,’ notes Rev. Dr. Gideon Para-Mallam, partner to ORFA and analyst.

‘Kidnappers work to Islamist goals.  Where young women are kidnapped, tortured and sexually violated, hope for normal married life, and family, may vanish.’

At the end of 2023, the IDMC² reported 3.3 million Nigerians were forcibly displaced from their homes and surviving in makeshift camps. The authors of the ORFA data project urged the international community to examine the data and to do more to fully understand the scale of the challenge to Nigeria.

1. see Appendix 9E and 10E in main report  ︎
2. IDMC:  International Displacement Monitoring Centre, data unit established as part of the Norwegian Refugee Council  ︎

Some days I cannot bear to look at Nigeria.

June, just one month ago, was such a time.  Pain poured from my phone each time I checked it. 

Pastor Paul Musa, of the Church of Christ in Nigeria, was filmed in terror videos in Cameroon, where his ISWAP captors have taken him and his poor wife.

Kneeling exhausted next to the black flag of terror, Pastor Musa pleads for his life as a gunman towers above him.  He has seven days to live, he says.  His ransom is 40 thousand dollars.

His congregation have made frantic efforts to raise cash.  His captors have refused what they offer.  

Yet another kidnapped Roman Catholic priest, Fr. Mikah Suleiman, was filmed in a humiliated state by his kidnappers in the Zamfara forests.  ‘I’m the only one here,’ he says. ‘They’ll kill me if a ransom isn’t paid.  Don’t abandon me to these monsters…’

They are just the latest victims of what is dubbed the ‘clergy abduction spree’.

The two are clerics.  And more:  their churches provide the social services of their neighbourhoods, offering education, infant daycare, assistance for the needy and community representation.

The assault on them reverberates through generations, attacking the futures of hundreds, possibly thousands, at a stroke.

ORFA data

This week, a major study by The Observatory of Religious Freedom in Africa – which I was involved with – records the scale of the attack on Christian communities.

55,910 people were killed in the context of terror groups over the four years. 

It maps a frenzy of kidnapping, with abductions spiralling :  2020 (1,665 abductions) 2021 (5,907 abductions)  2022 (7,705 abductions) and 2023 (6,225 abductions). 

Overall, a Christian is 1.4 times more likely to be abducted than a Muslim.   

But as a proportion of the population of individual states, Christian abductions are extraordinary.  Abduction of Christians as a proportion of their minority populations is very high.  In terms of local population, around 5.1 Christians are abducted for every Muslim.

It is little wonder that Christian populations are on the move.

‘Attack the shepherd – you scatter the flock.’

The fleeing of Christians in the aftermath of a priest murder, or priest abduction, happens almost immediately.

At the Annunciation Benedictine Monastery in Kwara State, last October, we heard the sickening details of elderly monks dragged from their beds by gunmen and terrorised.

Three priests-in-training were taken away.  One – Brother Godwin Eze – was murdered and his friends forced to carry his body and throw him into the river.   His murderers, who rang the monastery to inflict days of religious insult and abuse upon the monks, promised to return.

Almost overnight, the decision was made:  the monastery was abandoned.

“By attacking a monastery, also a centre of economic life, the violence has the same effect as a terrorist attack,” said Marcela Szymanski, of Aid to the Church in Need. “The population runs for safety, abandoning land and property to the Islamist terrorists … they become destitute overnight.”

I believe it is this scattering of the flock that is the purpose of attacking clergy.

As I write this piece, I am flooded with memory.

Two of my friends, good shepherds I knew well, were murdered in the most barbaric manner.

Fr. Vitus Borogo was murdered in June 2022.  He was followed and shot with precision and timing as he travelled to visit a farm.

A wonderful talker, Fr. Borogo was treasured for his strength and warmth in consoling victims of violence in Southern Kaduna.  He was the first to every bereaved family, a source of  wisdom and comfort.

Then, perhaps two weeks after Fr. Borogo was savagely murdered, a second blow fell: my dear friend, my sparring partner and supporter, Fr. John Mark Cheitnum, vanished.  

Fr. John was snatched from his own rectory in Southern Kaduna, at Yadin Garu, along with Fr. Denatus Cleopas.  I am a Protestant, but Father Mark had no interest in distinctions like this, and when I needed someone to support my scholarship application, he sat and wrote a wonderful testimony for me. 

We exchanged WhatsApps and debated politics.

In my last talk with him, he urged a group of us young men on WhatsApp to ‘cast a moral vote’ in the election.  We feared violence;  Fr. Mark hated violence.  I can still hear his voice.

Others known, or also linked to my community, have also been taken:

Rev. Fr. Basil GBuzuo’s fate is still unknown after he was whisked away by gunmen on May 15, 2024 along the Eke Nkpor-Obosi bypass in Onitsha Anambra state.  My namesake, seminarian, Stephen Naaman was burnt to death when armed Fulani herdsmen invaded the St. Raphael Parish in Kafanchan Diocese in Southern Kaduna in September of 2023.

And the supporters of this evil even speak about their fantasies.

Just earlier this year, the Muslim cleric, Idris Tenshi, called for the killing of our own First Lady, Oluremi Tinubu, in a sermon – simply because she is a pastor of the Redeemed Christian Church of God.

“Tinubu’s wife is an unbeliever, and even among the unbelievers, she is a leader… she is among those that Allah has instructed us to kill, because she is among the leaders of the unbelievers,” the cleric brazenly proclaimed, later offering a weasel-worded apology to try to wriggle away from censure.

Extraordinary bravery

I cannot place myself in the shoes of a church leader in Nigeria today.  Courage does not even begin to cover it.

Church leaders are our pillars of hope, education and social cohesion.  When they are killed, they leave open wounds.  

We need them.  We need leaders who can conduct an interfaith dialogue, who can lead communities in peace, and protect the diverse tapestry that is Nigeria’s strength.   They are our light in a dark world. 

As long as our shepherds are hunted, we are hunted, too:  every freedom, every right, and every social provision they offer is under attack. Their struggle is not the plight of one faith, but for the universal rights of human dignity and  the right to live in peace.